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Ruling through the International Criminal 
Court’s rules: legalized hegemony, sovereign  
(in)equality, and the Al Bashir Case1
Governando por meio das regras do Tribunal Penal 
Internacional: hegemonia legalizada,  






This article investigates sovereign (in)equality as a phenomenon that is manifested in the 
different levels of international institutions. The analysis is developed from the process against 
Omar Al Bashir, Sudan’s President-in-Office, at the International Criminal Court. Considering 
that norms and rules have a social role in the multiple relations existing between agents and 
structures, that is, they transform relations in the international system, the article investigates 
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the dispositions and principles present within the scope of the International Criminal Court 
that authorize a discrimination between States. This distinction implies the imposition of 
international rules for some actors and the maintenance of certain sovereign prerogatives 
for others. More specifically, international criminal justice is characterized by selectivity 
in judgments, as some countries are given certain authority over the regime. In this sense, 
it is argued that the sovereign (in)equality that is present in international criminal law is 
simultaneously a manifestation and condition of possibility for the hierarchy in the social, 
and therefore institutional normative, and political architecture of the international system. 
It is argued that the presence of this sovereign (in)equality can be identified at the different 
levels of the institutions of international society, insofar as they influence one another.
Keywords: International Criminal Court; Al Bashir Case; Norms; United Nations Security 
Council; Sovereign (In)equality.
Resumo
Este artigo investiga a (des)igualdade soberana como um fenômeno que se manifesta nos 
diferentes níveis de instituições internacionais. A análise é desenvolvida a partir do estudo 
do processo contra Omar Al Bashir, presidente em exercício do Sudão, no Tribunal Penal 
Internacional. Considerando que normas e regras possuem um papel social nas múltiplas 
relações existentes em meio a agentes e a estruturas, ou seja, elas transformam as relações 
no sistema internacional, o artigo investiga as disposições e princípios presentes no âmbito 
do Tribunal Penal Internacional, que autorizam uma discriminação entre os Estados. Essa 
distinção implica a imposição de regras internacionais para alguns atores e a manutenção 
de certas prerrogativas soberanas para outros. Mais especificamente, a justiça internacional 
penal é caracterizada pela seletividade nos julgamentos, uma vez que é conferida a alguns 
países certa autoridade sobre o regime. Nesse sentido, defende-se que a (des)igualdade 
soberana que está presente no direito internacional penal é, simultaneamente, manifestação 
e condição de possibilidade da hierarquia na arquitetura social, e portanto normativa 
institucional, e política do sistema internacional. Argumenta-se, assim, que a presença 
dessa (des)igualdade soberana pode ser identificada nos diferentes níveis das instituições 
da sociedade internacional, na medida em que elas influenciam umas às outras.
Palavras-chave: Tribunal Penal Internacional; Caso Al Bashir; Normas; Conselho de Segurança 
das Nações Unidas; (Des)igualdade Soberana.
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Introduction
During the drafting process of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), there was a tension between two principles: sovereign autonomy 
and inequality (SIMPSON, 2004). One of the important topics discussed at the 
Plenipotentiary Conference in 1998 concerned the role of major powers in the 
functioning of the ICC. It was intended that the Court’s jurisdiction could be 
triggered in two ways: the first, through a self-referral by sovereign states that 
autonomously ratified the Rome Statute; and, the second, following the referral 
of a case by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). There was, however, a 
concern that this second triggering mechanism would establish a power prerogative 
of certain states over the regime of international criminal law. This aspect marks 
all institutional building enterprise and negotiation internationally, especially 
because it is intimately connected to a consequent increase in the production of 
unequal international orders while establishing international institutions and not 
undermining them as some enthusiasts would advocate. 
In the final document of the Rome Statute, Article 13(b) established that 
the UNSC would have the power to refer cases to the Court due to its authority 
on matters relating to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This section of the Charter 
famously establishes that it is for the UNSC to determine “the existence of any 
threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression” and, in such situations, it 
must take appropriate measures in order to “maintain or re-establish peace and 
security” (UNITED NATIONS, 1945, art. 39). Mirroring UN Charter’s article 2(6), 
the prerogative of the UNSC under Article 13(b) authorizes the initiation of a 
procedure by the ICC against any UN member-State – even if it is a non-signatory 
country of the Rome Statute. In other words, it makes possible for the UNSC to 
go beyond the sovereign prerogative of States – in voluntarily binding themselves 
to a treaty (or not) – by giving it the authority to ground universal jurisdiction, 
and, hence, internationally trumping the non-signatory State’s sovereign will and 
decision to – not – ratify the Rome Statute.5 
5 The activation of a third-party jurisdiction – meaning that the Court could initiate an investigation over situations 
involving states that are not party to the Rome Statute – deserves to be mentioned as a complement of our 
argument. Morris (2000) argues, for instance, that the activation of the powers of ICC towards nationals of 
States that are not party to the Rome Statute has to do with two main patterns: “There will be cases involving 
strictly a determination of individual culpability and cases that will focus on the lawfulness of the official acts 
of states” (MORRIS, 2000, p. 364). This typology allows us to point to the fact that Sudan, our case study, 
lies in this second category of cases in which States do not opt, at any time, to have their nationals under the 
individual criminal accountability regime established by the Court.
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Considering the UNSC’s institutional architecture and (great) power 
composition, and, most specially (or exceptionally), the position occupied therein 
by the five (extra)sovereign states with permanent seats and veto powers, the ICC’s 
jurisdictional (infra)structures institutionally express an – (un)equal – order and 
ordering (LINDAHL, 2013). While some States are structurally (self-)immunizable, 
the rest – signatories or not to the Rome treaty – are subjectable, that is, not 
(self-)immunizable to the ad hoc (or exceptional) universal jurisdiction of (the 
UNSC through) the ICC. This legal-political, institutional arrangement reflects, we 
argue, what Simpson (2004) calls “legalized hegemony,” that is, a condition in 
which the privileges of certain states are not only legitimized, but also legalized 
through legal rules and institutions such as the UN Charter and the UN, and the 
Rome Statute and the ICC.
The UNSC made use of this “hegemonic imperative” for the first time in 
its referral of the Darfur case to the ICC. After the UNSC referral and the ICCs 
preliminary investigations, the ICC issued in 2009 an international arrest warrant 
against Omar Al Bashir, the acting Head of the Sudanese sovereign state. Al Bashir 
was the first acting Head of State to be indicted by the ICC (and through the 
UNSC). This case points to two controversial issues in the ICC regime. The first 
concerns the UNSC’s authority to refer or defer a case from the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
The second regards the capacity of the UNSC to waive an acting head of state’s 
immunity.6 The case against Al Bashir at the ICC is relevant and essential because 
it points not only to disputes within the framework of international criminal law, 
but also to constitutive tensions or aporias of the modern international order 
more broadly. In this case, questions about the power of the UNSC to submit a 
non-signatory state to the Court’s jurisdiction and the prerogative to remove the 
immunity of an incumbent head of state touches upon the sovereign (in)equality 
between the state actors in this international regime.
It is meaningful the fact that the Al Bashir Case has already been set as a 
precedent for a subsequent situation in Libya, involving the referral of Mr. Muammar 
al-Gadaffi by the same UNSC to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at ICC’s 
headquarters. As a sort of path-dependent trajectory, Libya is also not a State 
Party to the Rome Statute and Muammar al-Gadaffi was also a serving head of 
state when targeted by the Court.
6 If the state has signed the Rome Statute, the Court itself has the capacity to overthrow the immunity of the Head 
of State. According to Article 27(1) and 27(2) that official capacity is irrelevant when it comes to the individual 
criminal accountability established the Court and consent to the Rome Statute formally affirms this irrelevance 
of official capacity. 
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From this, it is understood that the political matters of the Al Bashir Case 
are associated not only with the more immediate issues of the regime, but also 
with the fundamental institutions and the political-legal order and ordering of 
international society. In order to establish such a relationship, the model of 
hierarchy of international institutions developed by Christian Reus-Smit (1999), 
which divides international institutions into three groups, is used as a theoretical 
framework. In general, the hierarchy to which the author refers recognizes 
the constitutional structure as the deepest level of values that constitute the 
international society. It conditions the fundamental institutions that, in turn, 
influence specific regimes. A study of the sovereign inequality manifested in the 
ICC regime is therefore necessary. The same goes to its manifestations in two 
other instances: the fundamental institutions and constitutional structure of the 
international order. Through the study of the Al Bashir Case, this paper questions 
the legalized hegemony crystallized in the rules of the ICC’s institutional framework. 
In addition to the specific problems of the institutions, these controversies present 
in international criminal law point to other more fundamental questions of 
international relations, in the sense that it shows how justice can be used as a 
mechanism for ordering the international society.
If this is true, there would not be necessary to deal with the ICC framework 
in terms of a permanent trade-off between order and justice, sovereignty and (the 
enforcement of) human rights (YAMATO, 2014). For justice would be subordinated 
to the interests of those who claim the responsibility for the maintenance 
of international society and its (or their) ‘law and order’: the great powers. 
Agreeing with Cui and Buzan (2016, p. 183), who have recently affirmed, “We are 
particularly interested in uncovering whether and how particular conditions in 
international systems/societies facilitate or obstruct the operation of GPM [Great 
Power Management]”, our contribution does not maintain ICC as a judicialized 
international institution that entails a universal justice and constrains international 
order, but as a secondary institution that kept a primary international society 
institution untouched, that is: the great power management.7
7 The concepts of primary and secondary institutions are connected to an English School theoretical tradition of 
IR (see, for instance, BULL, 2002; BUZAN, 2004; HOLSTI, 2004). While the former are connected to patterned 
international behaviours of states, the latter are a deliberate choice of states which design these formal institutions 
in a coherent manner, since they would allow for the maintenance and even naturalization of previously installed 
behaviours.
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In this sense, the Al Bashir Case is important because it raises questions 
about the authority exercised by the five permanent UNSC members and their 
capacity to act on issues concerning international criminal law. Cases such as 
these, which point to problematic issues in the structure of international criminal 
law, allow for discussions about the very foundations underlying international 
society. In this sense, it can be seen that broader problems, often identified with 
the architecture of international relations, such as inequality among states, are also 
manifested in specific structures, such as the international criminal justice system. 
However, these are not a mere expression of a global phenomenon. The more 
specific international institutional practices and arrangements are embedded in a 
context of mutual constitution in which, in addition to reproducing a hierarchical 
logic that is manifested in the structure of international society, they also allow 
this structure to be maintained and reproduced. From this arises the need for 
problematization of the normative-institutional apparatus within which these 
situations are inserted.
In order to analyse these problems, we can also draw on Nicholas Onuf’s 
proposal to think of social arrangements as indissociably related to the (re)
production of three conditions of rule: hierarchy, hegemony, and heteronomy. 
Hence, the theoretical positioning adopted is, in some sense, plural, seeking to 
depart from the thought of Reus-Smit and Onuf, with influences of certain critical 
readings not only from International Relations, but also from International Law. 
In this sense, this paper seeks to establish a dialogue between the International 
Relations and International Law literatures, especially because it seeks to 
study the institutions of international law and international criminal law. Such 
interdisciplinary enterprise allows raising questions concerning international 
institutions that would otherwise not be possible.
Moreover, it is worth saying that there are different positions in the literature 
on the implementation of interdisciplinarity between International Law and 
International Relations. It includes debates on whether or not it is possible to 
establish a relationship between the two disciplines, the problems and advantages 
of adopting an interdisciplinary methodology, the boundaries established in each 
discipline, and the constant (re)definition of each discipline’s identities that result 
from these efforts (LEANDER; WERNER, 2016; YAMATO; HOFFMANN, 2018).
Therefore, this paper seeks to engage with the critical literature of International 
Law and International Relations in order to analyse the problem of sovereign (in)
equality in the regime of international criminal law and its relationship with the 
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architecture of international society.8 For this, we begin with the conceptual basis 
of the paper, with the formulations of Christian Reus-Smit and Nicholas Onuf about 
the working of rules and institutions in international society. Then, we go into the 
case study,9 explaining the most important aspects of the Al Bashir Case that help 
to point out the manifestation of sovereign inequality in the ICC’s regime. In the 
following section, we focus on the literature that point this problem – sovereign 
inequality –exemplified by the case in the previous section. Finally, we draw our 
concluding notes, pointing to how the sovereign inequality highlighted in the 
Al Bashir Case can be seen, at the same time, as a manifestation and a condition 
of possibility of a phenomenon that is entrenched in the social architecture of 
international society.
From international rules to the ruling of the international
Christian Reus-Smit (1999) draws a distinction between the institutions 
that compose the international order in three sets, which would be, from top to 
bottom, respectively: specific regimes; fundamental institutions; and constitutional 
structures. These institutions would be hierarchically ordered, in a way that a 
higher level would be influenced by that which represents its basis. 
At the first level, are regimes dealing with specific areas. Under this category 
are the arrangements of rules built directly by the actors. The specific regimes are 
based on fundamental institutions which, in turn, are “the elementary rules of 
practice that states formulate to solve the coordination and collaboration problems 
associated with coexistence under anarchy” (REUS-SMIT, 1999, p. 14). They make 
up what Reus-Smit (1999) calls the “basic framework” for cooperation between 
states. Their existence is fundamental so that the regimes can be established, 
because they are the fundamental institutions. These institutions, unlike specific 
regimes, are not altered simply by a change in actor’s interests and they transcend 
8 This paper is heavily influenced by certain critical literature in both fields of International Relations and 
International Law, even though it does no engages directly with it. The paper pays significantly attention to an 
IR literature, but we have been paying attention specially to TWAIL scholars and critical readings of International 
Law, such as Martti Koskenniemi. In particular, see Koskenniemi (2011), mainly chapter 7, which speaks directly 
with the topic addressed in this paper.
9 Although we work with a case study, as was highlighted in a comment by one of the anonymous referees – 
which we are very grateful for – it is important to clarify that this article follows a more theoretical-interpretive 
line of argument instead of an empirical one.
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changes in the balance of power in the international system. In the society of 
states, we can identify a series of fundamental institutions, among them diplomacy, 
international (criminal) law, multilateralism etc.
Finally, the basis is the constitutional structure, which influence the nature 
of fundamental institutions. These are “foundational institutions,” the deepest 
socio-normative level (REUS-SMIT, 1999). They represent 
[C]oherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms 
that perform two functions in ordering international societies: they define 
what constitutes a legitimate actor, entitles to all the rights and privileges 
of statehood; and they define the basic parameters of rightful state action 
(REUS-SMIT, 1999, p. 30).
Constitutional structures, therefore, are so named because they incorporate 
the basic principles that, in turn, will produce and shape practices within 
international society. Thus, they restrict actors’ actions by establishing guidelines 
for conduct. Three normative components allow constitutional structures to play 
this role: (1) a hegemonic idea about the moral purpose of the state; (2) the ordering 
principle of sovereignty; and (3) a rule of procedural justice (REUS-SMIT, 1999).
These elements operate in a way that the moral purpose represents the 
central part of this normative complex, since it provides the basis to justify the 
other components. The moral purpose of the state represents the reason to ensure 
the ordering of political life in communities that have autonomy in relation to 
the others and a centralized authority. It is characterized as moral by the fact 
that it establishes rules from a conception of what would be the best form of 
organization for political units. In addition, the existence of a hegemonic notion 
of a moral purpose of the state does not mean that this is the only one, but that 
this belief was socially approved to dictate the political principles of political life. 
This foundation establishes the rules of entry and for institutional practices. The 
ordering principle defines how the differentiation of units will be made. In the 
society of states, it is the principle of sovereignty that plays this role. However, 
it must be pointed out that the claims of sovereign authority in international 
society can take various forms. The norms of procedural justice are the last 
element that composes this complex. They determine the proper conduct taken 
by legitimate actors. However, they do not prescribe principles, just precepts 
about what would be right or fair behaviour within the international environment 
(REUS-SMIT, 1999).
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However, this model is only partially of use in this paper. Reus-Smit (1999) 
attributes to the constitutional structure the function of conditioning the other 
international institutions. In this sense, he establishes a hierarchy between 
them according to their character of influence and consolidates the normative 
foundations of international society in the constitutional structure, attributing to 
it a character of foundational institution of the international order. His reading is, 
however, restricted, since it does not consider the social character of norms and 
rules in international society. The key to this understanding lies in the idea that 
these are neither situated in the agents nor in the structure.
Nicholas Onuf’s (1998a, 1998b, 2002, 2013a, 2013b, 2016) reading allows us 
to escape from the foundational character present in Reus-Smit’s formulation, 
through an understanding of the international as a social order. In this conception, 
the rules receive the status of a third element that lies amidst agents and structure. 
From this place, rules participate in the process of constitution of both, while it 
is also constructed in the process. Thus, “[t]hrough rules people constitute the 
multiple structures of society, and societies constitute people the agents” (ONUF, 
1998b, p. 172), that is, the definition of agents by rules is made in relation to 
institutional arrangements and the same applies to institutions, which are defined 
by the rules in relation to agents. Many institutions play the role of agents, made 
possible by their rules.
With this understanding, it cannot be said that the conditioning of other 
institutions happens in only one sense, as proposed by Reus-Smit’s scheme. As 
much as there are rules that have a distinct status, such as the ability to give some 
actors the power to introduce or end certain rules, Onuf’s approach does not have 
a hierarchically superior rule structure. The author’s reading points to a scenario 
in which the most important rules would not be crystallized in a structure, but 
would be determined by the agents themselves in the process of interaction.
In addition to helping to overcome some problems in Reus-Smit’s approach to 
international institutions, Onuf’s reading also makes it possible to understand the 
manifestation of sovereign inequality in the rules and institutions of international 
society. For Onuf, “[e]very society is saturated in rules” (ONUF, 2016, p. 4) and 
“where there are rules (and thus institutions) there is rule – a condition where 
agents use rules to exercise control and obtain advantages over other agents” 
(ONUF, 1998a, p. 63).
Rules, once they allow this unequal political and social interaction, possibly 
result in three conditions of rule, classified according to their function. The 
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hegemonic rule would correspond to the use of assertive discourses that inform 
the state of something and determine the agent’s action in relation to it. A second 
form would be the hierarchy, which is associated with rules of direction, that is, 
imperative norms in which orders are implicit and results in its obedience and 
acceptance. Finally, the third type of rule is heteronomy, which is associated 
with the notion of an absence of (absolute, complete) autonomy. This form of 
rule is related to the rules of commitment which are carried out in the form of an 
agreement (ONUF, 1998b, 2013b; NOGUEIRA; MESSARI, 2005). 
Even though agents are constituted from these forms of rule, they also 
participate in their constitution, since they have the capacity to act and change 
their social reality. Thereby, taking social arrangements as constituted from social 
relations allows us to understand the process of co-constitution between agents-
society-rules. From this, we can understand that the analysis of social relations 
should take rules as its departing point.
Onuf’s formulation of rules allows us to overcome the problem identified 
in Reus-Smit’s model of crystallization of the meta-values of the constitutional 
structure:
With the concept of rules, Onuf doesn’t admit anything as previously 
determined and provides instruments endogenous to his own theoretical 
contribution to analyse the diversity of social events. In this sense, the 
permanent construction and reconstruction of social life in general – and 
of international relations in particular – opens the door, indefinitely, for 
transformation, change or continuity. The world is truly ‘a world that we 
make’ (NOGUEIRA; MESSARI, 2005, p. 174, our translation10). 
Moreover, with this conception, it becomes possible to account for the 
presence of sovereign inequality in the institutions of international society. Once 
it is understood that the power arrangement in the system has an impact on 
the formulation of new rules, this model allows us to study the phenomenon of 
sovereign inequality, and even legalized hegemony, a situation in which great 
powers use their position of superiority in resources to transform privileges – often 
already existing – into norms.
10 Translated from the original: Com o conceito de regras, Onuf não admite nada como previamente determinado 
e providencia instrumentos endógenos à sua própria contribuição teórica para analisar a diversidade dos 
eventos sociais. Nesse sentido, a permanente construção e reconstrução da vida social em geral – e das relações 
internacionais em particular – abre a porta, de maneira indeterminada, para a transformação, a mudança ou 
continuidade. O mundo é verdadeiramente ‘um mundo que nós fazemos.’
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The Al Bashir Case: (re)reading the relationship between the 
ICC and the UNSC
The Al Bashir Case is revealing as it was the first case of the ICC in which 
its jurisdiction was based on article 13 of the Rome Statute – and, as previously 
stated, served as precedent for the Libyan situation. In other words, the UNSC 
made unprecedented use of its prerogative under Chapter VII of the United Nations’ 
Charter to initiate an investigation by the ICC. This case points to a central problem 
that is present in different spheres of international relations: the existence of rules 
that affirm sovereign inequality. The term describes the condition of a society of 
states in which some of them, in addition to their sovereign prerogatives, enjoy 
exclusive rights. From this privileged position, they have the capacity to restrict 
the sovereign rights of other states (SIMPSON, 2004). 
The Al Bashir Case11 began as of Security Council Resolution 1593 and is held 
by some authors as a milestone for international justice, for being the first time the 
UNSC triggered its jurisdiction over the ICC (BÖCKENFÖRD, 2010). However, the 
authority conferred on the UNSC by the Rome Statute is still a controversial topic, 
since the independence of the Court is considered to be an important institutional 
aspect that distinguishes ICC from its predecessor courts.
Since the establishment of the Al Bashir Case at the ICC, two arrest warrants 
have been issued against the acting head of state: the first on 4 March 2009 
and the second on 3 February 2010.12 The first warrant was sent to all States 
Parties to the ICC and to UNSC members who are not signatories to the Statute 
11 In the face of continued reports of massive human rights violations in the Darfur region, UNSC Resolution 1564 
of 18 September 2004, made the following requests: (1) that an international commission be established by the 
UNSC to investigate allegations of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Darfur; (2) 
to ascertain whether acts of genocide had been perpetrated; and (3) that the perpetrators of these violations 
were identified in order to be held accountable (UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 2004, para. 12).
 In accordance with Resolution 1564, the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, established the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID). The ICID report, which visited the country at the end of 2004, alluded 
to the practices employed by the Janjaweed militias, the Sudanese government and, to a lesser extent, by the 
rebels who, according to the rapporteurs, constituted crimes against humanity and war crimes (INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON DARFUR, 2005; OETTE, 2010, p. 374). In addition, it was stated that there were 
no indications of genocide, although acts of individuals with intent to genocide have been identified. Finally, 
the document further recommended that the UNSC refer the case to the ICC (OETTE, 2010, p. 347).
 The UNSC accepted the recommendation of ICID, in accordance with its prerogative based on article 13 of the 
Rome Statute, and indicated that the case of Darfur should be investigated by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
of the ICC, through Resolution 1593, on 31 March 2005.
12 Despite the issuance of arrest warrants, Omar Al Bashir remains at large, since he did not surrender – and was 
neither arrested nor surrendered – to the Court.
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of the Court (AKANDE, 2009a, 2009b). Although the request for the arrest and 
surrender of Al Bashir was addressed to each of the States mentioned, Resolution 
1593 made a request for States and regional organizations to cooperate with the 
Court’s requests (UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 2005). In face of this 
situation, the Sudanese government refuses to cooperate with the ICC. Officials 
in the country claim that the Sudanese judicial system has already dealt with 
the crimes committed on its territory against the civilian population.13 On the 
basis of the principle of complementarity,14 provided for in the Rome Statute, 
this would remove the competence of the ICC –, which means, therefore, that it 
is not necessary for the case to be addressed in international bodies. In addition, 
Sudan claims that it has no obligation to the ICC since it is not a State Party to 
the Court’s constitutive instrument (OETTE, 2010).
The Sudanese President, since the issuance of the first arrest warrant by the 
ICC, has carried out more than 60 official trips. Among the countries that have 
received Al Bashir, there are members and non-members of the ICC. In many 
13 In response to the indictment of Darfur's situation with the ICC, the Sudanese government established the 
Special Criminal Court for Darfur (SCCD) in June 2005. However, the defendants brought to SCCD were few 
and far from the country’s high political leadership. In addition, crimes covered by internal trials were restricted, 
and cases of common offenses committed in isolated incidents were often brought to court (OETTE, 2010, p. 347).
14 The principle of complementarity regulates the relationship between domestic and international criminal 
jurisdictions. It is provided for in the Rome Statute both in its tenth preambular paragraph and in Article 1. In 
the latter, it is defined that the jurisdiction of the ICC “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions” 
(ROME STATUTE, 1998, art. 1). This means that the Court functions as a supplementary mechanism and 
should not overlap with investigations and prosecutions of domestic crimes as long as they are in accordance 
with international law. The ICC must therefore operate in a way that complements those judgments, being an 
“additional concurrent jurisdictional layer that can intervene if and when domestic jurisdictions fail to bring 
genuinely to justice those suspected of having committed genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and – once the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction in this respect – the crimes of aggression” (NERLICH, 2009, p. 
346, emphasis in original). In theory, the ICC should give priority to the trial in a national forum, as established 
in article 17 (1) of the Rome Statute. It establishes that the Court must render inadmissible to try a case before 
the ICC in the following situations: (1) whether the case is being investigated or judged by the State that has 
jurisdiction over it (ROME STATUTE, 1998). However, in order to be considered inadmissible, there should be 
tried in the domestic proceedings the same individuals and crimes as in the ICC situation/case (PTC, 2006, para. 
31). Moreover, it is possible that a case is admissible to the ICC once it considers that it is not being genuinely 
investigated and tried by the State; (2) if the State having jurisdiction over the case decides, after investigation, 
not to judge the individual, unless it is considered that the decision was taken by the inability or unwillingness 
of the State to judge; (3) if the individual has already been tried for the conduct for which he is accused in the 
complaint (ROME STATUTE, 1998, article 17). However, the principle non bis in idem – which establishes that 
an individual will not be tried more than once for the same fact – will not be applied, as stated in article 20 
(3) of the Rome Statute, in cases in which the domestic trial happened “for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court” or when the proceeding 
is not considered impartial or independent in accordance with the rules of international law, so that there is 
no intention to bring the individual tried the Justice; and (4) if the seriousness of the case does not justify 
interference by the ICC, even in the absence of a domestic proceeding (ROME STATUTE, 1998, art. 17).
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cases, the failure to surrender Al Bashir to the Court resulted from a deliberate 
choice of those States.
With regard to the Rome Statute signatories that received the Sudanese 
President – as Chad, Djibouti, Malawi, Kenya, DRC and South Africa, for example – 
the Court requested the presence of their representatives, demanding explanations 
for non-cooperation in prison and handing over Al Bashir to the ICC (CRYER, 
2015). Nevertheless, no concrete action was taken by the ICC against those States. 
This has to do with the fact that only the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC 
(ASP) and the UNSC (in cases initiated by UNSC resolutions) have the power to 
implement decisions in the event of non-compliance with arrest warrants.
In July 2009, at a regular meeting of the African States Parties to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, which took place within the framework 
of the African Union (AU), members expressed great concern about the implications 
of the arrest warrant issued by PTC against Omar Al Bashir for the ongoing peace 
process in the country (AFRICAN UNION, 2009, para. 2). The Decision called for 
a number of issues to be discussed at the ASP meeting in Kampala, Uganda, in 
May 2010, of which the most relevant were: (1) the existence of Articles 13 and 
16 in the Rome Statute, which provides the UNSC with the ability to initiate or 
discontinue cases at the ICC; (2) a need for clarification by the Court the question 
of immunities of officers whose States are not parties to the Rome Statute; and 
(3) the implications of the practical application of articles 27 and 98 of the Rome 
Statute (AFRICAN UNION, 2009, para. 8).
In addition, the Decision expressed the frustration of African States with the 
fact that the request of the AU to the UNSC – asking it to defer proceedings against 
Omar Al Bashir in the ICC – in line with the prerogative conferred on that body 
by article 16 of Rome Statute – had not been even heard. The request was thus 
reiterated. Lastly, the most striking aspect in the decision of the African States 
Parties to the Rome Statute was the request for its signatories to not cooperate 
with the ICC regarding the Al Bashir Case – a possibility provided for in article 
98 of the Rome Statute (AFRICAN UNION, 2009, para. 9 and 10).
This situation led to the debate regarding the obligation to arrest Al Bashir 
when in the territory of a state party of the ICC, considering his status as head 
of state and the consequent prerogative of immunity based on international law.
The question of Al Bashir’s immunity, which stems from his status as acting 
head of state, is controversial. For the first time the ICC has a case against an acting 
head of state. There are precedents of judgments of former heads of state who did 
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not have immunity rights because they were nationals of Rome Statute member 
countries, which implies the waiver of their immunities.15 Before the question 
of whether, under international law, incumbent heads of state would enjoy the 
right to immunity from criminal jurisdiction and from orders of arrest in foreign 
states, many authors consider that Al Bashir is entitled to absolute immunity, 
even though he is accused of committing international crimes (AKANDE, 2009a).
The immunity of state officials was addressed in the ruling of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Case of the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000. In this 
case, which concerned, however, an individual who exercised the position of 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the ICJ judged itself:
[U]nable to deduce […] that there exists under customary international 
law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, 
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against 
humanity (ICJ, 2002).
The ICJ understood that the mere issuance of the arrest warrant by Belgium 
against an interim member of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s government 
constituted a violation of international law’s customary rules concerning the 
personal immunities enjoyed by foreign officials (author). The same reasoning can 
be applied to heads of state. There are, however, some differences: the arrest warrant 
against the Sudanese president was not issued by a foreign court and circulated 
in an international environment. It comes from an international court, being an 
international warrant for the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir (GAETA, 2009).16
After arguing that the immunity of heads of state is an impediment to the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by national courts, the ICJ sought to clarify the 
issue with regard to international criminal courts, ruling that immunity does not 
apply the same way. The ICJ decision referred to judgments in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and in the ICC. Regarding the ICC, it emphasized 
Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute, according to which immunities recognized under 
15 Even the trial of heads of state in other international criminal tribunals created after the 1990s is different, 
since the ICC was created based on a treaty.
16 The issue of immunity of heads of state was also discussed in two other situations: in the Pinochet Case, before 
the House of Lords, in the United Kingdom; and in the Belgium v. Senegal, at the ICJ. However, both cases 
concerned trials of former heads of state before national courts, claiming universal jurisdiction due to the crimes 
perpetrated.
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domestic or international law do not prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction 
over an individual (ICJ, 2002). However, the ICJ’s assessment of immunity from 
international criminal tribunals did not go further, as it was unnecessary for the sub 
judice case. As a result, a number of questions remain regarding the observation 
of the immunity of government officials before international criminal tribunals.
The ICJ’s assessment of the invalidity of immunities before international 
criminal tribunals is widely criticized, mainly because it mentions the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the ICC, without considering the differences between these courts. These 
distinctions are central to the discussion of the (in)applicability of the principle of 
immunity of heads of state. Although the ICTY and ICTR are international courts, 
they are ad hoc tribunals, different from the ICC, which is a permanent court. 
The two courts were created from UNSC resolutions, so they are vested with the 
authority of a measure adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The ICC, 
as explained above, was created on the basis of a treaty, so it is founded on the 
direct consent of the contracting states.
This distinction is fundamental because it has an impact on the obligations of 
states to execute the arrest and surrender warrants issued by those courts against 
individuals who enjoy personal immunities based on international law (GAETA, 
2009). When the ICTY and ICTR were created, the UNSC imposed obligations on 
all UN members to cooperate with these tribunals (UNSC, 1993, 1994). Therefore, 
although the ICTY Statute – or the UNSC Resolution establishing it – does not 
contain provisions on the breach of immunity, the issuance of the arrest warrant 
by the ICTY against Slobodan Milosević has been little questioned,17 since it 
is considered that the UNSC is able to remove the immunities of officials and 
governments’ representatives of UN Member States by virtue of their acceptance 
of Articles 25 and 103 of its Charter. In the case of the ICC, because it’s based 
on a treaty, it cannot do the same, since the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties states in article 34 that treaties cannot create obligations and rights to 
third states without their consent (INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 1969). 
In that sense, the Court only has authority to require the execution of an arrest 
warrant to its members.
The Al Bashir Case presents a difference from the situations referred to the 
Court by states themselves or by the Office of the Prosecutor: the fact that Sudan 
17 The questions raised indicate that the existence of jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunities, a position 
that is in line with the decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case (ICJ, 2002).
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is not part of the Rome Statute. This implies that Sudan has not waived its rights 
to immunity. On the other hand, since the Al Bashir Case stems from a UNSC 
resolution, it is argued that only the Security Council has authority to remove the 
immunity from Al Bashir.
Although not a state party to the Rome Statute, Sudan would be obliged 
to cooperate with the ICC because of Resolution 1593, which stated that “the 
Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate 
fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor 
pursuant to this resolution” (UNSC, 2005). Resolution 1593, therefore, establishes 
an explicit obligation under international law for Sudan, which includes the duty 
to arrest and surrender any individual requested by the ICC. This case raises 
questions about the violation of Sudan’s sovereign autonomy by a rule of the ICC, 
which authorizes the UNSC to bind that state to the statutory provisions of the 
Court, and consequently imposing obligations that were not adopted voluntarily. 
In sum, the Al Bashir case is questioned in this article because of these traces 
of sovereign inequality, not only found in the ICC, but also in other instances of 
international society.
As noted, the Al Bashir Case raises the discussion about the prerogatives given 
to some states by the Rome Statute over the ICC. By investing in large powers the 
ability to initiate an investigation against a state – which may or may not be a 
member of the Court – and to order that an investigation or trial under way in the 
ICC be discontinued, the Rome Statute crystallizes the condition of a select group 
of states as possessor of powers over the sovereignty of others. The signing of an 
international treaty is considered an expression of the sovereign will/autonomy of 
states. However, since this group – the five permanent members of the UNSC – has 
an express authorization to submit any State – with the exception of themselves, 
since the objection of one means the non-progress of the proposal – to that treaty, 
there is a trail of hierarchy and inequality to be followed.
The Case highlights precisely this issue. As the UNSC indicated that the ICC 
should investigate the situation in Darfur, Sudan was subject to the standards 
established by the Rome Statute. Provisions such as these establish differences 
between state sovereignties: while some have their sovereign rights violated, 
others not only maintain their prerogatives, but are also allowed to infringe upon 
those of others. The Al Bashir Case thus exemplifies the expression of a legalized 
hegemony.
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It is worth mentioning that the UNSC process of negotiation around the issue 
finished with the adoption of a resolution without any vote against it and eleven 
states in favour. To some literature, extreme influential on the ICC functioning, 
but that do not engage critically with our argument, 
[...] the resolution was an international vote of confidence in the ICC. The 
US, which had been campaigning against the ICC since its creation precisely 
because of the Court’s potential jurisdiction over nationals of states not 
parties to its Statute, had initially lobbied to other Security Council members 
to refer the situation in Darfur to another jurisdiction, for instance a joint 
African Union/United Nations Special Court for Darfur. But ultimately the US 
and even China, Sudan’s largest trading partner, did not veto the Council’s 
first referral to the ICC (NOUWEN, 2013, p. 248-249).
The veto power, being used or abstained by great powers, undoubtedly 
manifests the crystallization of a legalized hegemony within the United Nations. 
Nonetheless, the Al Bashir case makes evident that this transcends UN and both 
disseminate and articulate hegemony beyond it. Under any hypothesis – using 
or not the veto power – the Al Bashir case would be defined by the discretionary 
power of great powers and not by equal sovereign power of states.
The Al Bashir Case, Sovereign (In)equality, and Ruling through Rules
The Al Bashir Case in the ICC, as shown, is inserted in a very controversial 
context. The objective is not of investigating whether or not Al Bashir should 
be tried for the perpetration of international core crimes. The work sought to 
problematize the manifestation of sovereign inequality in the ICC, using the 
case study to elucidate how this hierarchization of sovereignties is expressed in 
the relationship between the Court and the UNSC. This section, then, builds on 
discussions on how the relationship of mutual constitution between different levels 
of institutions related to the ICC has an impact on the expression of sovereign 
inequality in each of them. The Al Bashir Case provides the opening to begin 
the discussion on the manifestation of sovereign inequality in the institutions of 
international society. It points to an aspect around which various questions can 
be posed: the authority of some states – the five permanent members of the UNSC 
– under the ICC regime. While some have their sovereign capabilities preserved, 
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others do not enjoy this privilege. There is a hierarchy in international society 
that separates the great powers (and other developed states) from those whose 
sovereignty is vulnerable to violations.
The key point of the manifestation of sovereign inequality in the Al Bashir 
Case is in the subjugation of Sudan to the Rome Statute. In other words, once 
a state is forced to comply with the norms of a treaty that it has not ratified, it 
directly touches upon the principle of state sovereignty. Sudan neither signed nor 
ratified the Statute of the Court. There are rules within the framework of norms 
of international law, such as Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which prohibits the creation of obligations by a treaty to a state that has 
not given its consent – through ratification. However, the Statute of the Tribunal, 
and other instruments such as the UN Charter, of which Sudan is a part, go in 
another direction. According to these documents, the UNSC has the competence 
to violate the sovereign prerogatives of a state.
This discussion points to the relationship between two types of institutions 
of international society, the specific regimes and the fundamental institutions, 
respectively the UNSC/ICC and international law/sovereignty/immunity of heads 
of state. One sees, therefore, how sovereign inequality is implied in the relation 
of mutual constitution. The establishment, by means of rules, of the relationship 
between the UNSC and ICC regimes, in the same way as the use of these rules by 
the Security Council to indicate a case to the Court – which, according to Onuf 
(2013b) also changes the rule, once it strengthens it – provokes changes in other 
fundamental institutions related to them. The adoption of a provision stating that 
the UNSC can enforce the Rome Statute’s rules for a non-signatory state alters and 
even manipulates the content of key institutions. In international law, this has 
an impact because it creates variations on the rule in its framework, according to 
which the creation, through a treaty, of obligations to third parties without their 
consent is not allowed. In other words, state non-parties, which have not expressed 
their agreement, are not subject to conventional rules that provide for obligations. 
The circumstances of the case seem to show that the third-party obligations rule 
has another meaning. The original notion that the third state must express its 
agreement continues to prevail, except in situations in which the UNSC decides 
to create obligations, submitting it to the ICC regime.
Regarding the principle of sovereignty, it is modified, gaining greater flexibility. 
Sovereignty is (re)signified so that its preservation is tied to a series of conditions. 
There is also a redefinition of who has the capacity to transgress this principle. 
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The same is true about the immunity of heads of state. Those who voluntarily 
join the Rome Statute are considered to waive their immunity rights. In the case 
of those who are not members of the Court, but which become states treated 
as parties, it is considered that immunity is also lost. In this case, there is the 
influence of another fundamental institution: human rights. Increased concern 
about serious violations of human rights and the consequent growth of norms 
dealing with these issues lead to changes in some principles. Once the superiority 
of rules of that institution is established, the conflicting principles become more 
flexible. Regarding the principle of immunity of heads of state, the ICJ decision 
confirmed the existence of immunity of a government official before the jurisdiction 
of a national court. However, it was affirmed that, in the case of an international 
criminal court, that immunity is overturned. It was decided, therefore, that in 
the event of a case involving the perpetration of grave human rights violations, 
immunities will not be maintained, thereby bringing about a change in this 
fundamental institution.
So far, with the Al Bashir Case, it was shown how there is a process of 
interaction between specific regimes and fundamental institutions. In regimes, 
place of the most basic practices, decisions, actions and speech acts represent 
changes in the already existing fundamental institutions and, at the same time, 
these institutions have certain rules that limit the scope of action of the actors. 
Thus, the sovereign inequality affirmed in the Al Bashir Case, based on the rules 
established by the Rome Statute, is also present in the fundamental institutions, 
since these principles begin to express an unequal pattern, as is the case of 
sovereignty, which is (re)understood to encompass the notion that there are 
situations in which it can be violated.
These rules, such as those conferring authority to the UNSC over the ICC, also 
have an impact on the architecture of the international system. The crystallization 
of such rules would result in the condition that Onuf (2013b) calls heteronomy 
(which occurs in conjunction with the conditions of hierarchy and hegemony, but 
their characteristics prevail). This condition is reached once there is a significant 
set of commitment rules, which are standards that inform the actors of their rights 
and duties (ONUF, 2013b). These rules, therefore, define certain prerogatives 
of certain agents and guarantee for others that their rights will not be violated. 
However, in this scheme, this reaffirmation for the actors of their autonomy is 
nothing more than an illusion. Agents are never completely autonomous. Their 
decisions are always linked to social reality.
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Under this condition of heteronomy is that much of the institutions of 
international society are formed. More specifically in the situation of the ICC, 
adherence to its constituent instrument, the Rome Statute, by ratification also 
creates such an illusion. The establishment of an international criminal court 
through a treaty, in contrast to the previous war crimes trials, was seen as a 
reaffirmation of the sovereignty of states, since the Court would exercise its 
jurisdiction only over those whom adhered to its statute. However, the idea of 
state autonomy was contrasted by a provision of the Rome Statute that established 
a mechanism through which the UNSC is given the capacity to indicate a case to 
be investigated and tried by the ICC. Hence, as already mentioned, the Council 
is empowered with the capacity to submit a state to a treaty to which it has not 
bound itself by its will.
The sovereign inequality that manifests itself in the regime of the ICC, as it 
has been emphasized, is not an isolated phenomenon. Although this institution 
is not directly associated with the UN system, once it defines that the UNSC has 
competence to act on all issues involving the theme of international peace and 
security, the ICC regime becomes closely intertwined with it. Thus, sovereign 
inequality in the UN is a condition for its expression in the ICC. And because 
Sudan is a member of the UN Charter, it is under the authority of the UNSC. In 
this sense, the Al Bashir case points to this phenomenon in both regimes in the 
Court and the UN.
In this interaction of different levels of international institutions, there is a 
second form of relationship – beyond the one among regimes and fundamental 
institutions – between the fundamental institutions and the architecture of the 
international system. The rules, insofar as they crystallize an inequality of resources 
existing between states, begin to express the disparities of the system. They 
establish a framework of legalized hegemony that gives the illusion that there is 
autonomy/equality between states, but also constitute a series of prerogatives for 
some. The establishment of such rules, marked by these two values – autonomy/
equality and sovereign inequality – such as those present in the Rome Statute 
and the UN Charter, in turn, influence the architecture of the system. Thus, 
there is a relationship between the three levels of institutions of international 
society. Therefore, one can see that there is a clear relation between the sovereign 
inequalities that are manifested in the different levels of institutions that compose 
the international order. And rules are the central piece in this scheme, being the 
ones responsible for producing the condition of heteronomy.
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Conclusion
The present article sought to problematize a very common assumption in 
International Relations: the idea that the anarchy that marks the architecture 
of international society presupposes sovereign equality. From this assertion, it 
was argued that there is a sovereign inequality in the international system that 
is reproduced in the different institutional levels of that order. This hierarchy 
between sovereignties is legitimized through rules that crystallize inequality in 
the system. From this, the article sought to understand how this expression of 
sovereign inequality in the regime of the ICC – through the Al Bashir Case – is 
related to the manifestation of this phenomenon in other institutions.
The fact that the UNSC is empowered to carry out exceptional measures 
in international society – such as interventions, or even the indication of a 
non-member country to the ICC – denotes a hierarchy among states that grants 
privileges to some and restricts capacities from others. The article, therefore, 
questioned the idea of sovereign equality, seeking to understand how, through 
the Al Bashir Case, the opposite can be verified. The case study paved the way 
for the problematization of sovereign inequality in international institutions. From 
this, we inquire about the interaction between the institutions that compose the 
international society and the relation between the expression of inequality between 
them and the architecture of the system. 
The Al Bashir Case serves as an entrance to the discussion of sovereign 
inequality in the institutions of international society. This Case marked the first 
time that the UNSC made use of one of the two prerogatives granted by the Rome 
Statute: that of requesting an investigation by the Court into a certain situation. 
In this case, the UNSC did so through Resolution 1593, which established an 
investigation into the situation in Darfur and held a reservation on the investigation 
of individuals of other nationalities other than Sudanese. By referring the case to 
the ICC, the UNSC submitted to an international treaty a state that had not ratified 
it, thereby violating the sovereign prerogative of binding international treaties by 
expressing its will. This relation between the ICC and the UNSC is considered 
a manifestation of sovereign inequality since it authorizes great powers to have 
interference over the regime of international criminal law. This hierarchy, as stated, 
is expressed in the ability of the UNSC to violate the sovereign prerogatives of a 
state through its subjection to a treaty to which it has not adhered.
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Based on this situation, the article analyses how the relationship between the 
different levels of institutions of international society implies the manifestation 
of sovereign inequality. With the creation – and use – of the norm that allows the 
UNSC to interfere in the ICC regime, a relationship is also established between these 
two specific regimes and the fundamental institutions related to them. Thus, the 
sovereign inequality that is expressed in the first relation is transposed to the second 
one, since it changes the actors’ understanding of these fundamental institutions. 
The standard that defines the relationship between the ICC and the UNSC also 
has an impact on the system architecture. As stated, the type of rules that prevails 
in the international society has an impact on its structure. And, as pointed out, 
the institutions of the international order are marked by ambiguity, so that they 
affirm at the same time the autonomy between states and sovereign inequality. The 
result of this type of rules, as stated by Onuf (2013b), is an environment marked 
by heteronomy, which is considered by the author as the situation in which actors 
believe they have autonomy but actually live in a hierarchical environment. In 
this sense, the assertion in these institutions of principles that point in different 
directions constitute international society as heteronomous.
This article, then, represents an effort of disputing the way anarchy in the 
international system is portrayed. The contribution of the present research, 
through a case study, to question the characterization of the international system 
as anarchic and marked by sovereign equality, through the use of theoretical 
conceptions explaining the interaction between institutions. While, on the one 
hand, the study of the Al Bashir Case in the ICC raises the discussion over the 
expressions of sovereign inequality in the international society, it also allows us 
to witness the material expression in international relations of the theoretical 
conceptions of the authors on whose ideas the present article was based. With 
this, it was highlighted how the different levels of institutions of the international 
society interact in terms of the expression of sovereign inequality. It has therefore 
been shown that, just as the structure of society has an impact on fundamental 
institutions and specific regimes, rules and norms are also participating in 
their construction and, therefore, in the making of a legalized hegemony in the 
international realm.
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